Drivers of Lifetime Earnings and Wealth: Skills, Frictions and Choices
Joint with Jonas Maibom , Christopher Taber and Rune Vejlin
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Short abstract
What drives lifetime income inequality? We estimate a continuous-time lifecycle model incorporating human capital accumulation, innate ability, search frictions, job wage premia, and non-wage amenities. Workers make consumption-savings decisions, and their asset position affects job acceptance. We estimate the model on Danish matched employer-employee data for 2008–2023. Counterfactuals show that innate ability is the dominant source of lifetime earnings inequality, accounting for over 90 percent of the variance. Search frictions and amenities matter for welfare rather than earnings: removing frictions reduces lifetime utility inequality by nearly 80 percent while leaving earnings inequality unchanged. Finally, several mechanisms have opposite effects on cross-sectional versus lifetime inequality, showing that the two measures provide different information.
Who Bears the Markdown?
Joint with Edoardo M. Acabbi and Andrea Alati
Draft available on request
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Short abstract
Which workers receive the smallest share of their contribution to production? We estimate individual markdowns in matched Portuguese worker–firm data for 2004–2023 by comparing production claims, estimated without pay data, with annualized earnings. Firm-year averages miss almost one third of log-markdown variation. Persistent firm differences account for 72 percent of log-markdown variance and worker differences for 28 percent. Markdown differences relative to coworkers persist after workers change employers. Worker and firm components partly offset: workers with high markdown components tend to work at firms with low ones. Grouping firms into broad classes loses most of this negative sorting. A rise in firm-specific export demand initially increases claims more than pay, temporarily widening markdowns.
Optimal Ramsey Taxation with Social Security
Joint with Marco Francischello and Matteo Paradisi
Project awarded with a Netspar Comparative Research Grant 2021
Draft available on request ›
Short abstract
We develop an OLG model with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty to study optimal Ramsey taxation when the government can use a credible set of social security instruments. Social security mitigates the income effect in optimal labor tax smoothing and, together with heterogeneity, adds new redistributive motives to both labor and capital taxes while crowding out others. We calibrate the model on three different economies: the US, the Netherlands, and Italy. We argue that the three countries would experience heterogeneous gains, in redistributive and efficiency terms, by moving from the status-quo allocations to those prescribed by a utilitarian Ramsey planner. Our simulations show that retirement benefits in the current economies are higher than their Ramsey-optimal level while we argue that the use of funded social security schemes, neglected in current actual policies, could be welfare improving.